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Abstract 
Brazilian policy makers have played an active role in agricultural credit 
policy durin~ the past 25 years. Many rules, regulations, policies and programs 
have been employed to increase the quantity and reduce the cost of agricultural 
credit. In some years, the amount of new loans made approached the value of 
agricultural output. Doubts exist about the extent to which expanded credit 
supplies accelerated technological change, expanded output and improved rural 
incomes. Large farmers absorbed a large share of the total credit. Interest 
rate constraints appear to have contributed to this concentration in credit 
distribution. The massive amount of subsidies involved in the credit program 
contributed to a need to reformulate credit and macroeconomic policies in the 
1980s. The volume of new loans made subsequently fell sharply. In spite of more 
than two decades of government involvement, Brazilian farmers are no closer to 
having a reliable, self-sustaining supply of agricultural credit today than they 
did in the early 1960's when the government began its heavy intervention. 
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THE DILEMMA OF AGRICULTURAL 
CREDIT POLICY IN BRAZIL 
Brazil has employed a variety of programs and policies during the past 
twenty-five years to expand the supply and reduce the cost of agricultural 
credit. The huge amount of resources and subsidies involved make the Brazilian 
experience particularly interesting relative to other developing countrjes that 
have also used agricultural credit as an important part of their agricultural 
development strategy. This paper reviews Brazilian credit policies and some of 
the impacts over the 1960-1985 period. It describes how these policies 
necessarily underwent changes in the 1980s because of the macroeconomic reforms 
that were undertaken. It concludes that Brazilian farmers still face a serious 
challenge in obtaining secure supplies of agricultural financing in spite of more 
than two decades of heavy government involvement in agricultural credit. 
A Brief Review of Agricultural Credit Policies 
Brazil pursued a rapid growth strategy during most of the period following 
the 1964 military takeover. Financial policy has served the function of 
financing the Federal budget, compensating certain sectors (notably agriculture 
and exports) for the adverse consequences of price controls and exchange 
overvaluation, and attracting foreign funds to support the current account 
deficit (World Bank). The strategy clearly suggests a "supply-leading" approach 
to finance and economic development. 
The stated objectives of agricultural credit were established in 1965 by the 
Agricultural Credit Law 4829: (a) finance a portion of operating costs of 
agricultural production and marketing, (b) stimulate capital formation, (c) 
accelerate the adoption of modern technology, and (d) strengthen the economic 
position of farmers, especially small and medium ones. Credit policies have also 
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been frequently adjusted to addross short-term problems like changing input and 
product prices and adverse weath'lr. Agricultural pricing and input policies have 
been used in conjunction with cr·~dit policy to influence factor use, enterprise 
selection and total output. 
In the mid-1960's, the National Monetary Council was given the 
responsibility for formulation o· agricultural credit policy while the Central 
Bank was given the responsibilit~r for administration. By 1978 the National 
System of Rural Credit had evolvnd to include the Central Bank, the Bank of 
Brazil and four other Federal ba1ks, thirty-three (33) state banks, fifty-six 
(56) private banks and several other financial institutions of minor importance 
(World Bank). The Bank of Brazil, however, has been by far the single most 
important credit source, especially in poorer areas and for small, low income 
farmers. 
A complex system of rules, regulations and programs was used these past two 
decades to influence the quantity, price and allocation of credit. At times as 
many as 150 special lines of credit were in effect. Three general features of 
agricultural credit policies domlnated most of the period. First, nominal inte-
rest rates on agricultural loans have been controlled at levels below those 
permitted for other types of loans. These controls frequently resulted in 
negative real rates of interest (i.e., nominal interest rates lower than the rate 
of inflation). Second, nominal interest rates for small agricultural loans 
(supposedly made to small farmers) have been set 1 or 2 percentage points below 
the ceilings spe~!fied for large loans. Third, incentives and controls have been 
used to induce b1nks to lend more of their own deposits and/or government funds 
to agriculture. 
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Credit and Perfor•ance of the Agricultural Sector 
The most striking feature of the Brazilian agricultural credit system has 
been the vast amount of money involved. In some years, the volume of credit 
approached the volume of output! Annual loan disbursements increased during the 
1960s and 1970s, but fell in the 1980's for reasons described below. 
Tht data in Table 1 report loans made each year and agricultural production 
for the 1960-85 period. 1 Columns 1 and 2 report operating loans, usually with 
terms of less than a year, which represented as much as 70% of the number and 60% 
of the vtlue of loans made in recent years. The remainder of the credit is split 
between narketing loans2 with terms of a few months and investment loans payable 
over sevfral years. 3 In this twenty-five year period, agricultural output 
approxim~te1y tripled while new loans made per year rose almost 9 times. The 
ratio of operating loans to agricultural output (column 6) rose from 0.06 in 1960 
to a peak of 0.52 in 1982 then fell to 0.26 in 1985, while the ratio of total 
loans to output rose from 0.12 to 0.80 then fell to 0.36. In 1975, the first 
ratio reached 0.37 and the second rose to 0.84 due, in part, to major funding for 
drought relief and coffee recuperation. The droughts of 1981 and 1982 reduced 
the value of agricultural output so the ratios appeared more favorable than they 
would have been if output would have continued its upward trend. These ratios 
are amongst the highest found in any Latin America country (Adams). 
This huge amount of agricultural credit should have made a significant 
impact on the agricultural sector. Because of the problem of fungibility, 
however, it is difficult to conclusively attribute to credit the changes that 
have occurred in Brazilian agriculture during these past two decades. Although 
there appears to be a correlation between credit and output in the data reported 
in Table 1, it is also obvious that credit has grown faster than output, and 
output continued at high levels in some years even when loan disbursements 
Table 1. - Agricultural Credit and output, Brazil, l9bu-~t>. 
Lonns Made During Yeara Gross Domestic 
----------------------------------------------------
Product (GOP) from 
Operating Loansb Total Agricultural Loans Agriculture Ratio of Operating Ratio of Total 
Year --------------~--------- ------------------------ !n Loans Made to Agricultural Loans to 
Numberc Value in 197J Numberc Value in 19J5 1975 
Cruzeirosd,e 
Agricultural GOP Agricultural GOP 
Cruzeiros Cr117.P1 ros (2/51 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1960 112 3,180 231 6,176 49,957 0.06 
1961 lM :umo ?05 6,157 50,755 0.06 
1962 337 -1,910 441 0,302 57,683 o.o8 
1963 416 4,410 549 7,?67 49,131 0.09 
1964 527 6,560 711 9,664 54,965 0.12 
1965 509 5,730 666 8,483 57,366 0.10 
1966 529 6,700 656 11,539 50,128 0.13 
1967 633 9,040 1,029 14,9:?5 53,194 0.17 
1968 733 11,470 1,500 21,019 53,341 0.22 
1969 675 9,624 1,145 20,716 56,866 0.11 
1970 649 10,992 1,191 24,648 53,717 0.20 
1971 686 12,394 1,253 26,401 63,300 0.20 
1972 667 14,706 1,266 35,321 72,701 0.20 
1973 771 21,286 1,400 49,852 91,297 0.23 
1914 769 27,757 1,450 61,648 102,307 0.27 
1975 1,076 39,446 1,856 89,997 107,349 0.37 
1976 1,059 111,886 1,832 92,143 132,007 0.29 
1971 1,011 '18,901 1,722 82,266 159,734 0.24 
1978 1,104 -15.6<}8 1.896 !!3,6'19 133,280 0.34 
1979 1,375 52,433 2,373 104,248 139,J54 0.''18 
1980 1,976 56,406 2,766 99,686 142,952 0.39 
1981 1,944 50,705 2,613 86,458 122,372 0.41 
1982 1,826 53,857 2,604 83,725 104,495 0.52 
1983 1,670 38,990 2,470 62,707 130,843 0.30 
1984 1,194 :?7,010 1,585 30,319 140,504 0.19 
1995 1,805 30,939 2,271 54,623 151,424 0.26 
a Source: Various Central Bank and Bank of Brazil reports (Brazil, Banco Central). Figures represent number and value of new 
loans made. 
b From 1960 to 1968, the estimates for operating loans are based on loans made by the Bank of Brazil, which was responsible for 
the ~ajority of agricultural credit lent during the period. 
C Thousftnd~ of loans. 
d 1 1fllion cruzeiros. Values adjusted by the index •2• of Conluntura Economica (Brazil, Fundacao Getulio Vargas). 
e Source: Brazil, ~~n~·~;n r.~~ul!o Vargas. 
14/5) 
(7) 
0.12 
0.12 
0.14 
0.15 
0.18 
0.15 
0.23 
0.28 
0.39 
0.36 
0.46 
0.45 
0.49 
0.55 
0.60 
o.8.f. 
0.70 
0.52 
0.63 
0.75 
0.70 
0.71 
o.8o 
0.48 
0.27 
0.36 
,l::-o 
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declined. In 1983, for example, agricultural output increased 25 percent while 
the real value of agricultural loans decreased by the same percentage. 
It is frequently argued that credit accelerated the adoption of both 
biological and mechanical technology. Credit lines were introduced for 
p1rchasing so-called "modern inputs" including improved seeds, fertilizer, lime, 
atricultural chemicals, and livestock r1tions. Nominal interest rates for thnse 
r ·edit lines varied from 0 to 7% much of the time. Chemical fertilizer use rose 
d·amatically from 380,000 metric tons in 1966 to a peak of 4.2 million tons in 
1 J80, before falling to 3.3 million in 1984. There have been reports of fraud 
i 1 credit use because the quantity of fertilizer supposedly financed in some 
r~gions has exceeded the amount actually sold. Purchasers of domestically 
m1nufactured machinery had access to five-year loans with nominal interest rates 
rtnging up to 15%, occasionally with a two-year initial grace period. Domestic 
t~actor production per year grew from 6,300 units in 1967 to over 63,00 in 1976 
b 1t then declined to 44, 687 units in 1E•84 (Brazil , Fundac;ao Getuli o Vargas) . 
Over half of the investment loan·; are typically reported for machinery purchase, 
a 1d about two-thirds of these lo.ms have been made in the states of Rio Grande do 
S1l, Parana, and Sao Paulo, which accounted for over 70% of the tractors reported 
01 farms in the 1970 and 1980 census. It is quite likely, then, that credit for 
i1vestment has been highly correlated with new machinery purchases. 
The 1970 and 1980 census offer insights into the nature of investment 
o~curring on Brazilian farms. Farmers reported investing Cr$ 4.4 billion in on-
ftrm investments for the year of the 1970 census, of which Cr$2.2 billion was 
s 1ent for machinery, livestock, and pernanent crops, all of which were eligible 
f~r credit. The Central Bank reported ~r$2.5 billion in new institutional loans 
f>r agricultural investments that year (Brazil, Banco Central}. For the 1980 
6 
census, aggregate on-farm investments amounted to Cr$ 579.1 billion {equivalent 
1o 25 billion in 1970 cruzeiros), of which Cr $359.7 billion (15.6 billion in 
1970 cruzeiros) were eligible for institutional loans. However, Central Bank 
statistics indic.tte only 7.0 billion (in 1970 cruzeiros) as the total value of 
new investment loans contracted by farmers in 1980. The data from both periods 
~uggest that farmers self-finance a considerable amount of on-farm investment in 
:pite of the large amount of credit borrowed. 
Changes in on-farm investment patterns should be reflected in the changing 
:tructure of farm capital. It was believed that the share of equipment rose 
~nile the share ·n real estate declined between 1940 ano 1965 (Schuh). Census 
d1ta do not appe.tr to support this trend, however. The 1970 census shows that 
6~% of total capital assets were represented by land and buildings, 18% in 
p~oductive and work animals, 9% in permanent crops, and 5% in farm machinery and 
v~hicles (Brazil, Funda~ao Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estat!stica). 
S1rprisingly, in the 1980 census, these proportions were 74% for land and 
buildings, 12% for animals, 9.6% for rermanent crops and 4.4% for machinery and 
~ehicles. Thus, it appears that the value of land and buildings still commands a 
large and growing share of farm capital because of increases in farming area and 
land prices. Some of the large increase in credit availability may have been 
capitalized in land prices so 1hat the land share has continued strong. 
A frequent criticism of the credit policy has been the extent to which the 
distribution of benefjts have contributed to a concentration of income and wealth 
(Graham et al.). An analysis of the 1970 and 1980 census reports the 
distribution of credit by farm size (Araujo and Meyer). Surprisingly, almost 90% 
of the Brazilian farms reported receiving no credit from any formal or informal 
source in the 1970 census and 1hat proportion only fell to 80% by 1980. Even 
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.tllowing for possible data limitations, credit use was much less widespread than 
anticipat1d. About one-third of the farms with 10 or more hectares reported 
receiving loans in 1980. Only 5% of the farms with less than 10 hectares 
reported loans. Thus, after 15 years of huge amounts of credit a significant 
number of farms in the country were still untouched by formal credit programs. 
Furthermore, farms with less than 100 hectares received a smaller share of credit 
from governmental entities than they represent in either share of number (•f farms 
or share of total output. Larger farms received a proportionately larger share 
of this credit. The effect of interest rate controls on the credit ratio! ing 
behavior of banks is believed to be an important factor in explaining why large 
farmers absorbed so much of the credit relative to small farmers. 
Analysis of the regional distribution of formal credit supplies showrd that 
approximately 75% went to the most commercialized agricultural regions. Jarmers 
jn the state of Sao Paulo alone produced 20% of the 1970 agricultural out 1ut and 
received one-fourth of the total formal credit. As a result, estimates OJ that 
state's credit to output ratio were even higher than for the rest of the nation. 
Contrary to the national trends, farm survey results suggested that this state 
was increasing the share of credit going to small farmers. In 1980 this picture 
changed somewhai so that farmers in Sao Paulo produced 19% of the Brazilian farm 
production and received 21% of total credit. The credit share in the states of 
Parar1a and Rio Grande do Sul was essentially unchanged while it increased in the 
states of Golas and Mato Grosso where the cultivated area was expanding rapidly. 
Changes in Credit Policy in the 1980's 
Agricultural credit policy changed substantially after 1980 (Araujo, 1983a; 
Arau. o and Meyer). External and internal debt problems, inflation rates ranging 
from 120 to 230% per year, and the high social cost and economic distortions 
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prevailing in the financial markets induced policy makers to implement a set of 
restrictive economic measures in 1981 and 1983 that affected the entire agricul-
tural sector. The real value of total farm credit declined 50 percent from 1979 
to 1985 (table 1) as a consequence of monetary controls on the supply side and 
contraction of farmer demand for credit. From 1985 to 1987 (the period of the 
so-called New Republic), interest rate policy was fundamentally altered. In 
1985, interest rates for agricultural loans were partially indexed by the 
government bond rate (OTN). Ill 1986 for the "Cruzado Plan," interest rates were 
frozen at nominal rates of less than 10 percent per year in the expectation that 
inflation would be close to zero. Due to the failure of the Cruzado Plan, in 
1987 interest rates were totally indexed for most of the country (except the 
northeast) so farmers paid 6 to 12% per year in real terms. 
fhe supply of agricultural loan funds was seriously affected by the volume 
and C•lmposition of bank financial liabilities. During much of the post-1965 
period, commercial banks were obligtted to lend to farmers at levels that 
approximated 30% of their demand deposits. At the beginning of the 1980's, the 
effects of growing inflation rates tnd the indexation of some financial 
instruments led to a radical change in the composition of bank liabilities. This 
can be seen in the rapid decline of the share of the demand deposits in the 
composition of total financial resources held by banks: 46 percent in 1970, 28 
percent in 1980, and 12 percent in J987 (Oliveira and Montezzano). 
The cost of the agricultural c'·edit program contributed to Brazil's economic 
problems and eventually forced a ch.tnge in policies. The implicit interest rate 
subsidy for agricultural credit increased geometrically from 1974 to 1979 due to 
a steady rise in the rate of inflation, and to the rigidity of nominal interest 
rates (Araujo, 1983b). This implicit subsidy was equivalent to Cr$ 0.07 per unit 
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o farm output in 1974, and climbed to Cr$ 0.15 in 1979. In 1982, this subsidy 
W<S estimated in Cr$ 0.08 per unit of output. In 1985 it declined substantially 
dt1e to the indexation of interest rates but rose again in 1986 under the Cruzado 
Ptan to Cz$ 0.20 percent of output. 
c •nclusions and Implications 
For more than two decades, Brazilian policy makers have utilized a complex 
S~>t of controls and incentives to increase the quantity and lower the cost of 
~~!cultural loans. The real volune of formal credit lent to farmers stetdily 
increased until the early 1980's wlen it began to decline. As of 1980, however, 
most farmers still did not receive loans from formal institutions and the amount 
going to small farmers was especially low. Agricultural output and the use of 
some modern inputs have expanded. But since value of production is a criterion 
for formal lending, it is difficult to clearly establish causality between credit 
and agricultural performance. Th(· expansion in use of modern inputs is 
associated with the increase in formal credit, but there has also probably been 
some substitution of external for internal funds. 
The banks' response to the dJstortions introduced into the financial market 
is understandable. Compensating balances, noninterest costs and fees have been 
widely used to increase the returns banks earn from agricultural loans. Those 
banks with a clear profit orienta1ion have been especially reluctant to increase 
long-term agricultural lending. Therefore, loan procedures are cumbersome and 
increase farmer borrowing costs. As demand deposits fell as a share of total 
bank financial resources (liabilities), so did the supply of agricultural loan 
funds. 
Two important unanswered questions exist regarding the Brazilian experience. 
First, what would have been the demand for and the impact of credit if 
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agriculture would have been less discriminated against through price controls, 
overvalued exchange rates, and export controls? Second, would bank performance 
have been better, especially on equity grounds, if there would have been more 
incentives for agricultural lending, especially with higher interest rates? The 
two questior.s appear to be related. Subsidized interest rates are rationalized 
to offset the discrimination of other policies. But interest rate cJntrols 
reduce bank profitability in agricultural lending. Thus. it is logical for banks 
to reduce costs by lending to large farmers and to use nonprice methods to 
allocate the excess demand for credit created by low interest rates. Additional 
indirect evidence of the impact of these regulations is shown by the relative 
decline in lending by private banks and the emergence of a very large market 
share for the government owned Bank of Brazil. 
The Brazilian case demonstrates the dilemma that emerges between 
agricultural credit policies and macroeconomic policies, especially monetary 
policies, when large amounts of subsidies are involved. Significant chan~es were 
made in Brazilian agr.icultural credit policy in the early 1980s because of needed 
adjustments in macroeconomic policies. The inflationary effects of huge amounts 
of agricultural credit were no longer supportable. Also beginning in the 1980s, 
policy makers began to look towards other policy instruments to stimulate the 
agricultural sector. Minimum price programs, investments in human capital, trade 
and commercial programs are expected to play more siHnificant roles compared to 
credit policy in the coming years. It is important to note, however, that there 
still remains a crucial issue for the Brazilian policymakers, namely to define 
and establish a stable and long-term strategy to accelerate agricultural 
development. 
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Brazilian farmers still do not have a stable, self-sustaining source of 
agricultural finance in spite of t·~o decades of government efforts. A basic flaw 
is now evident in the Brazilian st-ategy. Agricultural credit has been 
aJ,proached from the perspective of agricultural planning. Policies and programs 
htve been used to meet goals other than developing a viable, long-term 
j tstitutional system of agricultural finance. Creating conditions for the 
d~velopment of institutions to engage in rural financial intermediation has n' t 
l3en the primary objective. The dilemma today in Brazil is to find ways to 
cJnvince policymakers to view agricultural credit as part of a process of 
1 inancial intermediation rather than as part of agricultural planning. Policies 
t 1d programs other than subsidized credit must be relied on to stimulate 
t~chnological change, expand output and exports, and improve rural income. 
J. 
' < • 
I 
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FOOTNOTES 
Unlike the data found in many countries, these data report loans made rather 
than outstanding balance. Furthermore, loan delinquency and default has not 
been a problem in Brazil so these data effectively report the amount of new 
loans channeled into agriculture with previous levels of indebtedness 
representing a fairly small anount of the value of loans made. 
Substantial amounts of marketJng loans go to individuals other than farmers. 
Thus, column 2 underestimates the total short-term credit obtained by 
farmers, while column 4 overeftimates total credit. 
Little institutional credit if available for farm real estate mortgages, so 
investment loans are lent lartely to finance machinery, livestock, and 
perennial crops. 
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